Subject: [iyf] IYF-Bota Murder Case Closed/Littleton Decision Explained Date: Sun, 7 Nov 1999 09:48:00 -0500 From: owner-iyf-online@gpac.org MEDIA ADVISORY - FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Editor: Clare Howell, clare@gpac.org .RUBY BOTA MURDER CASE DROPPED .THE LITTLETON DECISION EXPLAINED RUBY BOTA MURDER CASE DROPPED ============================= [Gibsonton, FL: 7 Nov 99] CITING LACK OF EVIDENCE, the Hillsborough County (Florida) Sheriff's Dept. closed the murder case of Ruby Bota last month without an arrest. Ruby was a transgender woman who disappeared in 1988. Her badly decomposed body was unearthed this May behind the property in Gibsonton she shared with Bob Bota. They lived as man and wife. The medical examiner ruled that Ruby's death resulted from 'homicidal violence of an undetermined type.' Her body was tied with electrical cord and wrapped in plastic bags. She had evidently been bludgeoned with a bottle because small pieces of glass were found in the front of her brain. At the time of her disappearance Bob Bota told Ruby's friends that she had flown away with wealthy friends to live in Italy. No missing persons report was ever made. A friend of Ruby's, Jimmy Estep, said in May after her body was found, "I know she didn't fall off the face of the earth. Everyone knew she was a man. He had nothing to hide with us... She was a fine person and a member of our gay community. I know in my heart she was buried over there. I know someone killed her." The Tampa Tribune reports that Bob Bota has now admitted to striking Ruby with his elbow eleven years ago and later finding her dead. He says he then buried her. Now, eleven years after her murder and six months after her body was found, Hillsborough County law enforcement officials announced that the case is closed. Said GenderPAC's Riki Wilchins, "We have often pointed out that murders of genderqueers simply don't 'count' in the same way that others do. Few cases illustrate the point as clearly as this one." ### THE LITTLETON DECISION EXPLAINED ================================ [New York, NY: 7 Nov 99] ON 27 OCT 99 THE COURT of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas issued a decision in the case of Littleton v. Prange, which has been understood as holding that a post-operative male-to-female transexual is legally male. We talked to Dana Priesing, a Washington D.C. attorney who works with GenderPAC about the implications of this decision. IYF: What was this case about? DP: The defendant was a doctor (Prange) who was accused of wrongfully causing the death of trans-woman Christie Littleton's husband. Prange introduced Ms. Littleton's original birth certificate (which identified Littleton as male), and moved for summary judgment arguing that Littleton, despite being anatomically female, remained legally male and therefore could not be the spouse of her deceased husband. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment. Littleton appealed to the Court of Appeals and by a vote of two to one the court affirmed the lower court's ruling. IYF: Tell us about the Appeals Court's decision. DP: Chief Justice Hardberger's opinion for the majority relied on the following agreed facts: Littleton, a post- operative transexual, was born a physically healthy male, has male chromosomes, looks like a woman, wishes to be and believes herself to be a woman, has man-made female genitals, vagina, and breasts, and lacks the internal sex organs of a woman. After a brief survey of some of the law and medical discussion, the majority opinion noted that Texas prohibits same-sex marriage and that the Texas state legislature had passed no law providing guidance about the recognition of marriages involving transexuals. Feeling itself incapable of fashioning judicial standards for marriages involving transexuals, the majority held that, "As a matter of law, Christie Littleton is a male. As a male, Christie cannot be married to another male. Her marriage to Jonathan was invalid, and she cannot bring a cause of action as his surviving spouse." Justice Angelini, in a concurring opinion, emphasized that Littleton was not physically intersexed, but only psychologically at odds with her birth sex. Justice Lopez, in a dissenting opinion, noted that the trial court had granted Littleton's petition to amend her birth certificate. According to Lopez, that event effectively nullified the original (male) birth certificate on which defendant Prange's summary judgment motion relied and raised a genuine factual issue concerning whether Littleton is male or female. Consequently, summary judgment should not have been granted. IYF: What do you think of the majority opinion? DP: I see this as another in a long line of cases whipsawing gender-different plaintiffs between a phobic legislature and a phobic judiciary, each using the other's gutless failure to confront this oppression as support for further negative assumptions about the affected class. Where is the justice? What interest is served by denying this woman the right to seek compensation following the death of her life partner? IYF: Does this decision apply to situations other than Littleton's case? DP: Here's the narrow answer. This holding applies to Littleton and to any resident of Texas whose factual circumstances are identical. The holding retroactively nullifies Littleton's marriage of seven years. I'm not an expert in the law of the state of Texas, but I would suggest that any male-to-female transexual in Texas who is married or is considering marriage consult a lawyer. Here's the broader answer. The more the facts differ from Littleton's, the less likely it is to apply. Does the holding nullify the marriages of intersexed Texans, e.g., women born with Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome, who may have had some genital surgery? I don't think so, given Justice Angelini's concurrence, which carefully distinguishes cases in which there is physical as well as psychological ambiguity. Does this holding constitute controlling authority outside Texas? No. It is a creature of the Texas state court system only. It could be looked to by way of analogy in courts in other states, however, in much the same way as Justice Hardberger surveyed the law of New Jersey and Ohio. IYF: Does this decision mean that people cannot legally change their sex? DP: No. It means that a non-intersexed, fully post-operative Texas transexual whose birth certificate still identifies his or her birth sex has not legally changed his or her sex in the State of Texas, and consequently cannot lawfully marry a person of the same birth-sex in the state. IYF: What next? DP: Well, time, budget, and local rules permitting, Littleton could seek reconsideration, making an argument along the lines suggested by the dissent, namely that since her birth certificate was amended to identify her sex as female, it was erroneous of the majority to rely so much on the original birth certificate. If that fails, Littleton could appeal to the Texas Supreme Court. There is another interesting wrinkle here. The majority opinion speaks of the failure of the Texas state legislature to provide guidance concerning the legal status of 'marriages' involving 'transexuals.' That sounds suspiciously like the majority believes Littleton can marry neither a man nor a woman. If so, Littleton (and other similarly situated Texans) likely have a claim that they are being singled out and deprived of rights guaranteed to all U.S. citizens. One way to test this would be for a male-to-female Texas transexual to apply for a marriage license to marry a woman. IYF: What are the implications of the Littleton decision for medical service providers who work with transexuals? DP: The decision interjects uncertainty into their work. The Texas medical community should join the Texas trans- community in approaching the Texas legislature to overturn the decision of the Appeals Court. ### Subscriptions. Please contact: Subscribe@Gpac.org For prior releases, check the GenderPAC website at: http://www.gpac.org (c) 1999 InYourFace GenderPAC's independent online news-only service for gender activism. The opinions expressed are not necessarily those of GenderPAC's Board, Officers, or membership.