Subject: Successful Motion That Disqualified Paul Cameron as an Expert Witness
From: [email-masked]
Date: Thu, 17 Jul 1997 22:28:50 -0600

To Whom This Concerns:

We would like to submit a copy of the motion that was recently approved
in a Colorado District Court that disqualified Paul Cameron from
testifying as an expert witness in a child custody case.

The motion was written by attorney Julie Tolleson (Director of Colorado
Legal Initiatives Project) and filed by attorney Denise Saathoff on
behalf of a bisexual father. The wife had hired Cameron to testify
against her husband due to his bisexuality. The bisexual husband hired
Dr. Jerry Bigner as an expert witness to rebutt Cameron's testimony.
Attorney Tolleson's motion was approved by the Larimer County Colorado
(Ft. Collins) District Court thus disqualifying Cameron as an expert
witness. Dr. Bigner (who is well-known for his respected research on gay
fathers) was then not needed to testify as an expert witness since the
judge ruled also that the issue of sexual orientation was irrelevant to
the proceedings.

We hope that you will accept this motion for public consumption since it
represents the third time that Dr. Cameron has been disqualified as an
expert witness. This motion represents a logical, legally referrenced
manual for others to use in disqualification motions for subsequent
future appearances by Cameron in other legal proceedings. The actual
names of the petitioners have been changed to protect their privacy,
even though this motion is a matter of public record. Permission is
granted to use this information for reference purposes.The file is
titled Motion In Limine.txt.

Julie Tolleson, J.D.
Jerry J. Bigner, PhD

DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF LARIMER,STATE OF COLORADO CASE NO. 96DR682 =

COURTROOM D

CO-PETITIONER'S MOTION IN LIMINE WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITIES

In re the Marriage of:

Jane Doe

Petitioner,

and	=

John Doe

Co-Petitioner.

Co-Petitioner John Doe ("Mr. Doe"), through his attorneys Denise L. Saath=
off and Julie C. Tolleson, =

hereby moves, in limine, for an order 1) excluding the testimony of Paul =
Cameron and 2) barring all other =

reference to Mr. Doe's sexual orientation.

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Doe is a bisexual father of two. In her Endorsement of Witnesses, Mrs=
=2E Doe indicates that she =

will use the testimony of Paul Cameron, Ph.D. (=93Cameron=94) to address =
"the impact [Mr. Doe's sexual =

orientation] will have upon visitation and custody of the two young boys =
in this case." In a report appended =

to the witness list, Cameron recommends that Mr. Doe =93see his sons only=
 under the direct supervision of a =

responsible adult who is aware of the potential (1) for John to attempt t=
o introduce his sons to his sexual =

lifestyle." (See Petitioner's Endorsement of Witnesses and Report attache=
d thereto.)

(1) Of course, this =93potential=94 is not supported by hard evidence but=
 rather relies on Cameron's stereotype-
based speculation of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals as "recruiters." The o=
nly "fact" cited in Cameron's report =

in support of this defamatory claim is John's statement that he would not=
 reject his sons if they turned out to =

be homosexual or bisexual. See Cameron report, page 2.

Mr. Doe respectfully submits that Cameron is a full-time anti-gay religio=
us activist whose =

participation in a judicial proceeding is wholly inappropriate. His long-=
discredited research does not comport =

with professional standards and is irrelevant. This court need not and sh=
ould not allow itself to be used as a =

soapbox for Cameron's political and religious views.

Cameron's testimony should be excluded from evidence. Cameron is not qual=
ified to provide a =

custody evaluation (or its equivalent), and his expected testimony does n=
ot satisfy the standard for =

admission as expert opinion evidence. Moreover, Mr. Doe's sexual orientat=
ion is irrelevant in any event.

Trial in this matter is scheduled for July 8-9, 1997. Because the court's=
 ruling on this question will =

profoundly influence the direction and scope of trial preparations, Mr. D=
oe respectfully requests a pretrial =

ruling on the issues raised herein.

ARGUMENT

I. Cameron Is Not Statutorily Qualified to Opine Regarding Custody of the=
 Doe Children.

Colorado Revised Statutes =A714-10-127 (1996 Cum. Supp.) sets forth the m=
ethod under which a =

mental health professional makes an evaluation and submits recommendation=
s in a custody dispute. As a =

matter of Colorado law, Cameron is not qualified to conduct a custody eva=
luation. Section 14-10-127 =

specifically provides that custody evaluations may be performed only by "=
the court probation department, =

any county or district social services department, or a licensed mental h=
ealth professional." Cameron is =

none of these (2) yet he purports to perform the very functions of a cust=
ody evaluator.

(2) Cameron is not licensed in Colorado, and his Nebraska license (as a p=
sychologist) is inactive.

2

C.R.S. =A7 14-10-127(4) prohibits admission of Cameron's proffered report=
 or testimony. It provides =

that a person "shall not be permitted to testify regarding a custody or p=
arenting time evaluation" unless the =

witness is qualified in each of six specified areas:

	(a)	The effect of divorce and remarriage on children, adults, and famili=
es;
	(b)	Appropriate parenting techniques;
	(c)	Child development, including cognitive, personality, emotional, and =
psychological development;
	(d)	Child and adult psychopathology;
	(e)	Applicable clinical assessment techniques; and
	(f)	Applicable legal and ethical requirements of child custody evaluatio=
ns.

Id. Cameron's expertise is in none of these areas; rather, he purports to=
 be an expert on
homosexuality. Also, his opinion must be based on interviews with all par=
ties. C.R.S. =A7 14-10
127(6)(a). Cameron has not interviewed Mr. Doe. His testimony and report =
thus may not
be admitted. Marriage of Sepmeier 782 P.2d 876, 879 (solo. Ct. App. 1989)=
(1988
amendment prohibits testimony from witness not satisfying statutory stand=
ards).

Mrs. Doe had an opportunity, through a specific statutory mechanism, to s=
ecure an evaluation upon =

motion to the court. See C.R.S. =A7 14-10-127(1)(a)(1). She failed to do =
so. Instead she sought to bypass that =

process by having Cameron perform the same functions but without motion o=
r order of court. This she =

cannot do. By setting forth a comprehensive mechanism under which parties=
 may submit outside opinion =

testimony regarding custody and parenting time, the legislature foreclose=
d the kind of end-run attempted =

here.

II. Cameron's Opinion Testimony Should be Excluded Because He Does Not Sa=
tisfy the Standards for =

Expert Witnesses.

If Cameron's opinion testimony is not being submitted as a custody evalua=
tion, then what is it? It is =

certainly not opinion testimony derived by applying objective scientific =
criteria

3

to a set of facts. Indeed, Cameron came to this dispute having in his min=
d a foregone conclusion: that Mr. =

Doe must not, under any circumstances, have contact with his children. Th=
is conclusion was reached based =

on no other data than that Mr. Doe is bisexual. So, even without the stat=
utory infirmity discussed supra, =

Cameron's testimony is inadmissible. =

A. The Standard for Admission of Expert Testimony: An Overview

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2789, 2795 (1993), =
the Supreme Court held =

that expert testimony must be both relevant and reliable. A trial judge m=
ust, at the outset, determine if the =

expert will testify based on scientific knowledge and if the testimony wi=
ll assist in determining a fact in issue. =

Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.(3)

The court must make "a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or=
 methodology =

underlying the testimony is scientifically valid." To do so, the trial ju=
dge should weigh five factors inquiring =

whether the theory 1) is testable, 2) has been subjected to peer review a=
nd publication, 3) has a known or =

potential error rate, 4) is controlled by adequate standards, and 5) is w=
idely accepted within the relevant =

scientific community. Id. at 2796-97. Moreover, [a] known technique that =
has been able to attract only =

minimal support within the community may properly be viewed with skeptici=
sm." Id. at 2797. Finally, the =

proffered testimony must "assist the trier of fact to understand the evid=
ence or to determine a fact in issue." =

Rule 702. That is, it must be relevant. ld., 113 S. Ct. at 2795.

B. Cameron's Body of Work is Not Psychology; It is a Political-Religious =
Manifesto.

Cameron's "theories" about gay people have commanded disavowal and expuls=
ion from scientific =

circles. See infra section IIC. The court, then, should view Cameron's as=
sertions with more than skepticism.

(3) Expert testimony must comply with Colo. R. Evid. 702 in order to be a=
dmitted at trial. This rule mirrors =

its federal equivalent. See Fed. R. Evid. 702. State courts, including Co=
lorado, look to the federal courts for =

guidance in interpreting the rule and admissibility standards.

4

The court must recognize the testimony for what it has been determined to=
 be in the scientific community: a =

non-credible, distorted, and biased political agenda. =93[H]omophobic bia=
s vitiates any value his testimony =

might have . . . =93  Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 950 (Wyo. 1995)=
 (criticizing the testimony of an expert =

witness). Therefore, Cameron's testimony must be excluded because it fail=
s the minimum reliability test =

outlined in Daubert.

In 1984 and 1985, Cameron's "Institute for the Scientific Investigation o=
f Sexuality," issued =

"educational pamphlets." The pamphlets included "Child Molestation and Ho=
mosexuality," the cover of =

which showed a young boy being dragged into the men's room, and "Murder, =
Violence and Homosexuality," =

the cover of which showed a young girl cowering under an ax blade. See At=
tachment A. In another =

pamphlet, Cameron writes, "Gays are an octopus of infection stretching ac=
ross the world. Fresh, undiluted =

pathogens are its daily food and excrement. Most gays are veritable Typho=
id Marys . . . " Pamphlet, What =

Homosexuals Do (It's More Than Merely Disgusting), Institute for Scientif=
ic Investigation of Sexuality.

In 1985, Cameron wrote an opinion piece entitled, "Protect Public: Quaran=
tine Gays." USA Today, =

Feb. 6, 1985, Attachment B. In it, he wrote, "Gays posture as victims, bu=
t they earn their AIDS." Id. =

Describing gays as "addicts," he writes: =

Most of the 4 million U.S. gays are infected with the AIDS germ.

A realistic hope of slowing down the AIDS epidemic involves =

quarantining gays, closing all bars and baths, criminalizing homosexual
acts that involve exchange of bodily products, and closing the borders
to homosexual travel.

Id.

5

Cameron's penchant for misrepresentation and panic-inducing stereotyping =
has already extended to =

this case. On May 15, Cameron submitted a letter explaining why Mr. Doe (=
whom Cameron never =

interviewed) should not coach his son's T-ball team. Claiming that [Son 1=
] is entering the age group that =

begins to be attractive to men who have sex with men," Cameron proposed t=
hat John be prohibited from =

coaching unless each of [Son 1=92s] teammates (and their parents) were ma=
de "aware that bisexual males are =

considerably more apt to incorporate boys into their sexual practices ...=
=2E" See letter, Attachment C hereto.

C. Cameron is Not Professionally Credible.

Paul Cameron has made a cottage industry of fueling fears and stereotypes=
 about gay, lesbian, and =

bisexual people. Under the guise of "research," Cameron and his Family Re=
search Institute ("FRI") have =

traveled the country seeking to spread their extremist views through the =
media and the courts. Cameron has =

been expelled from and denounced by professional and scientific associati=
ons, and has been reprimanded =

by the courts for his misconduct. At least one Colorado court has barred =
Cameron's testimony, holding that =

it did not constitute proper expert testimony in a custody case. Abbott v=
=2E Abbott (Weld County Dist. Ct. 89 =

DR 222). Mr. Doe asks this court to be mindful of Cameron's jaded history=
=2E(4)

1. A Federal District Court Has Found Cameron Engaged in Distortion and M=
isrepresentation.

In Baker v. Wade, 106 F.R.D. 526 (N.D. Tex. 1985), Cameron offered many o=
f the same claims =

and conclusions which he will present to this court. In its reported deci=
sion, the

(4) Even the vita Cameron submitted in this case contains a misrepresenta=
tion. On page 4, column 2, he =

lists among his court appearances testimony for the State of Colorado in =
the Amendment 2 trial. In fact, =

Cameron was never called as a witness at trial (neither in person nor by =
affidavit), in part because of the =

credibility problems surrounding his work. See Richard Cendo, "Why Did No=
rton Pay?. Denver Post, Oct. 2, =

1994 at FO2 See also "Another Payment by Norton to Discredited Gay Expert=
 Cameron Disclosed," Out =

Front, Sept. 28, 1994. (quoting Gale Norton: "I know affidavits were prep=
ared . . . but we did not use his =

testimony. It was not submitted, ultimately, as evidence.").

6

Court criticized Cameron for making misrepresentations to this Court." Id=
=2E at 536 (emphasis in original). The =

Court described Cameron's sworn testimony as a "total distortion" of data=
=2E Id.

2. Cameron Has Been Expelled From, or Repudiated By, Numerous Professiona=
l Organizations.

Fourteen years ago, the American Psychological Association ("APA") expell=
ed Cameron for =

violating the Ethical Principles of Psychologists.

The charges of unethical conduct against Dr. Cameron included his continu=
ing =

misrepresentation of Kinsey data and other research sources on homosexual=
ity, =

inflammatory and inaccurate public statements about homosexuals; and his =

fabrications to a Nebraska newspaper about the supposed sexual mutilation=
 of a =

four year old boy by a homosexual. Baker v. Wade, 106 F.R.D. at 536-37 n.=
31. =

(emphasis added). See also APA Notice, Attachment D.

Cameron's credibility troubles did not stop with the APA. The association=
 in his home state of =

Nebraska, the Nebraska Psychological Association, has also =93formally di=
sassociated itself from the =

representations and interpretation of scientific literature offered by Dr=
=2E Paul Cameron in his writings and =

public statements on sexuality." See NPA Minutes of Fall, 1984, Attachmen=
t E hereto. The American =

Sociological Association (ASA) has also charged Cameron with "misinterpre=
t[ing] and misrepresent[ing] =

sociological research on sexuality, homosexuality, and lesbianism." ASA R=
esolution, August 1986, =

Attachment F hereto. One year later, the ASA issued another declaration f=
ormally denouncing Cameron. =

Memorandum from W. V. D'Antonio, Attachment G hereto and article from Jan=
uary 1987 FOOTNOTES, =

Attachment H hereto. The Midwest Sociological Society has also issued a r=
esolution asserting that "Paul =

Cameron has consistently misinterpreted and misrepresented the research o=
f social scientists in the study of =

gays and lesbians." See Attachment I hereto.

7

3. Cameron has Been Repudiated by the Professional Peers He Cites in his =
"Research."

In the past, Cameron cited Dr. Alan Bell of Indiana University in support=
 of his anti-gay "findings." =

Dr. Bell has publicly stated, "For him to use our figures to estimate dif=
ferences between homosexuals and =

heterosexuals across the board in the general population is ludicrous." (=
5) Dr. A. Nicholas Groth, a =

Connecticut expert on sex offenders, complained to the Nebraska licensing=
 board, "[Cameron] =

misrepresents by findings and distorts them to advance his homophobic vie=
ws.... He disgraces the =

profession." Letter from A. N. Groth to Nebraska Board of Examiners of Ps=
ychologists, Attachment J hereto.

D. Cameron's Assertions are at Odds with Established Scientific Findings.=

Cameron's contention that homosexuality renders a parent per se unfit to =
have custody of or =

unsupervised visitation with his own children is contrary to the overwhel=
ming consensus in professional =

circles. More than 20 years ago, the APA adopted a resolution holding tha=
t "[h]omosexuality per se implies =

no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability, or general social and =
vocational capabilities." 30 American =

Psychologist at 633 (1975). See also Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9t=
h Cir. 1983)(according to generally =

accepted canons of medical practice, homosexuality is not a mental disord=
er). Under Daubert, the court can =

and should consider that Cameron's claims are not accepted within the rel=
evant scientific community. =

Daubert at 2797. ("[a] known technique that has been able to attract only=
 minimal support within the =

community may properly be viewed with skepticism.").

III. Mr. Doe's Sexual Orientation is Not Relevant to this Proceeding

Mr. Doe has already acknowledged to this court that he is bisexual. Howev=
er, this fact should not be =

used as grounds to introduce inflammatory speculation. Moreover, Mr. Doe =
respectfully submits that his

(5) D. Walter, =93Paul Cameron.=94 The Advocate, October 29,1995 at 32.

8

bisexuality, and Cameron's expected testimony concerning it, are being in=
troduced for no other reason than =

to prejudice this proceeding. Put simply, sexual orientation is not relev=
ant to custody and parenting time =

determinations, and all testimony regarding it must be excluded.

Colo. Rev. Stat. =A7 14-10-124 (1987) provides that the courts determinat=
ion shall be guided by the =

best interests of the children. The statute sets forth a list of 13 facto=
rs the court shall consider in making its =

assessment; sexual orientation is not one of them. Indeed, the statute pr=
ovides that the court "shall not =

consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his relatio=
nship to the child[ren]." C.R.S. =A7 =

14-10-124(2). In this case, Petitioner is alleging that Mr. Doe's status =
alone (with no allegation regarding =

conduct) should be considered. Colorado statutes preclude it.

Petitioner's planned attack is also improper pursuant to Colo. R. Evid. 4=
03. Under Rule 403, =

evidence should be excluded if the probative value is substantially outwe=
ighed by the danger of unfair =

prejudice. People v. District Court, 785 P.2d 141, 147 (solo. 1990) (stat=
ing that unfair prejudice "is given a =

more specialized meaning of an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an=
 improper basis"). Here, =

testimony regarding Mr. Doe's sexual orientation (whether through Cameron=
 or any other witness) has no =

probative value and is being offered solely to prejudice this tribunal. I=
t therefore should be excluded.

A. Excluding Sexual Orientation Testimony Is Consistent with Colorado Law=
=2E

Colorado appellate courts have not addressed whether sexual orientation i=
s relevant to child =

custody. Two previous Colorado decisions, however, provide clear guidance=
 as to how the court should view =

Mr. Doe's bisexuality. In Christian v. Randall, 33 Colo. App. 129, 516 P.=
2d 132 (solo. Ct. App. 1973), the =

trial court granted custody to the mother instead of the father after not=
ing that the father was "going through =

a transsexual change." Id. at 134. The appellate court reversed, holding =
that that the "status of the =

respondent[is] not sufficient grounds for changing custody." Id. at 133. =
Similarly, in re Marriage of Moore,

9

35 Colo. App. 280, 531 P.2d 995 (solo. Ct. App. 1975), a Colorado court d=
enied custody to a mother who =

shared her home with her live-in boyfriend.(6) In reversing the ruling, t=
he Court of Appeals held that the trial =

court was not authorized to merely infer risk to the children based on mo=
ral opposition to the living =

arrangements. Id., 531 P.2d 996.

So, more than twenty years ago Colorado courts refused to consider the co=
ntroversial issue of =

transsexualism relevant to child custody, and prohibited an individual ju=
rist from basing a custody =

determination on a moral objection. Consistent with this legal tradition,=
 sexual orientation (as merely a moral =

or =93lifestyle" issue) cannot be considered a relevant factor in determi=
ning child custody.

By raising the specter of bisexuality, Mrs. Doe and Cameron seek to infla=
me biases based upon =

stereotype and myth. Colorado courts, however, have refused to render dec=
isions based upon bias. The =

Colorado Supreme Court has held unconstitutional a law which denied legal=
 protections for gays and =

lesbians. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (solo. 1994) (declaring Amend=
ment 2 unconstitutional); =

af~d,116 S. Ct.1620 (1996). Likewise, this court need not provide a forum=
 for anti-gay bias.

A majority of other courts hold that sexual orientation should not be con=
sidered a relevant factor in =

child custody or visitation determinations. See In re Marriage of Wicklun=
d, 932 P.2d 652 (Wash. Ct. App. =

1996) (=93the trial court abuses its discretion if it restricts parental =
rights because the parent is gay or =

lesbian."); Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633 (III. App. Ct. 1993) ("T=
he fact that respondent is openly =

involved in a lesbian relationship is not grounds to restrict respondent'=
s visitation with her son.");

(6) The trial court had held that =93such adulterous conduct in the opini=
on of the Court constitutes conduct . . . =

that can and does affect the parties' relationship to the children, and t=
hat such conduct is immoral, and that =

such conduct reflects upon the mental and physical well-being of the chil=
dren and in fact is detrimental to =

the mental well-being of said children." 531 P.2d at 996.

10

A.C. v. C. B., 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) ("Petitioners sexual ori=
entation, standing alone, is not a =

permissible basis for the denial of shared custody or visitation.'); Conk=
el v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio =

Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting the presumption that homosexuality constitutes =
an acceptable basis to establish =

the unfitness of parentage); M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (N.Y. 1986)=
 ("[I]t is impermissible as a matter =

of law to decide the question of custody on the basis of the father's sex=
ual orientation."); Bezio v. =

Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass.1980) ("[A] mother's sexual preference p=
er se is irrelevant to a =

consideration of her parenting skills.").

Although courts in a small minority of states have penalized parents base=
d on sexual orientation, =

their opinions illustrate the extreme nature of these holdings. For examp=
le, one such court wrote that =

"homosexuality [is] errant sexual behavior which threatens the social fab=
ric" and minors should be protected =

from the influence of "those who advocate homosexual lifestyles." J.P v. =
P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786, 792 (Mo. =

Ct. App.1989) (quoting Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (1985)).=
 The J.P. decision illustrates an =

animus toward gays and lesbians which should not serve as a basis for det=
ermining the best interest of a =

child. In that case, the court's moral judgment provided the basis for th=
e decision against the lesbian parent. =

In Colorado, however, it is a child's best interests, not a court's polit=
ical preferences, which provides the =

basis for a custody determination. In re Marriage of Moore, 35 Colo. App.=
 280, 283, 531 P.2d 995, 997 =

(solo. Ct. App.1975). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Romer, only o=
ne court has penalized a gay or =

lesbian parent for sexual orientation. See Ward v. Ward, No. 95-4184,1996=
 WL 491692 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. =

Aug. 30, 1996).(7)

(7) Ward was widely criticized because the father was convicted of murder=
ing his previous wife but still =

received custody over the lesbian mother.

11

B. Potential Social or Private Opposition to Gays, Lesbians, or Bisexuals=
 Is Irrelevant to the Custody =

Determination

Cameron and Mrs. Doe will no doubt argue that Mr. Doe's bisexuality may b=
e grounds for social =

condemnation and embarrassment for the children and, therefore, it is in =
the children's best interest to have =

minimal contact with him. Courts do recognize that a parent's gay, lesbia=
n, or bisexual identity may be =

grounds for social condemnation and embarrassment for a child. These same=
 courts, however, hold that =

social condemnation and a child's embarrassment should not be a basis for=
 determining the custody of =

children. See. e.q., R.S. v. S.S., 677 N.E.2d 1297 (III. App. Ct. 1996) (=
interpreting a statute modeled after =

the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act which is similar to the Colorado =
statute); Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31 =

(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (deciding the case under the best interest of the c=
hild statutory directive); S.N.E. v. =

R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985) (stating that "it is impermissibl=
e to rely on any real or imagined =

social stigma attaching to Mother's status as a lesbian"). In fact, a chi=
ld will not escape harassment or =

embarrassment even if custody is granted to the heterosexual parent. M.P.=
 v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1262 =

(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (stating that "neither prejudices . . . =
nor the curiosity of . . . peers about [a =

lesbian mother's] sexual nature will be abated by a change of custody").

The Supreme Court has also addressed the impact of private biases. See Pa=
lmore v. Sidoti, 466 =

U.S. 429 (1984). In Palmore, the Court held that an infant child could no=
t be removed from the mother's =

custody based upon racial prejudice. Id. at 433. Therefore, while it may =
be true that a child may face some =

societal opposition to his or her parent's sexual orientation, such oppos=
ition would exist regardless of this

(8) In Blew, the court overruled the trial court's imposition of restrict=
ive visitation for a lesbian mother. The =

trial court based its decision on the child's discomfort with the teasing=
 directed at his mother's sexual =

orientation. The appellate court held the trial court's rationale to be u=
nlawful, because "courts must never =

yield to prejudice." Id. at 35 (quoting In re Custody of Temos, 450 A.2d =
111,120 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).

12

court's disposition regarding custody or visitation. It thus is not deter=
minative of the best interest of the =

children.

The Colorado legislature recognized the sacredness of the relationship be=
tween the parent and =

child. See Rev. Stat. =A7 14-10-124(1) (1987) ("[I]t is in the best inter=
est of all =

parties to encourage frequent and continuing contact between each parent =
and the minor children of the =

marriage after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage.").=
 Yet Mrs. Doe attempts to deprive =

Mr. Doe, the father of the children, of custody and visitation based upon=
 stereotype, myth, and fear. This =

Mrs. Doe cannot do.

CONCLUSION

This Motion is not motivated by mere disagreement with Cameron's proposed=
 opinion testimony. =

Rather, it is uniquely warranted because Cameron's testimony contains no =
indicia of reliability, is proffered =

for political ends rather than relying on the facts of this particular ca=
se, and does not satisfy the legal =

standards for expert testimony. Moreover, Mr. Doe's sexual orientation is=
 wholly irrelevant.

	DATED this10th day of June, 1997.

Julie Tolleson, No. 24885
P.O. Box 300397
Denver' Colorado 80203 =

(303) 830-2100 =

and

Denise L. Saathoff, No. 20969
211 W. Myrtle Street
Ft. Collins, Colorado 80521-2817
(970) 224-2026