Fight the Right Action Kit NO ON 9 CAMPAIGN FIELD STRATEGY ----- by Thalia Zepatos, Campaign for a Hate-Free Oregon ----- VOTER IDENTIFICATION In September 1992, we set a goal of identifying 100,000 Oregon voters' positions on Measure 9 through Voter Identification (Voter ID) phone banks. At a statewide training organized by OUTPAC in Eugene, we presented a plan and methodology that was adopted by many local campaigns around the state (although not all had the resources to take on the phone ID program). We tested several phone scripts - we called high support areas of Portland and solicited contributions and volunteers from among our supporters; we also tested a persuasion script. After several trials, we adopted a simple three question ID script that did not identify the caller as being from the No on 9 campaign because our tests showed that skewed the results. Voters were coded "1" - voting No on 9; "2" - Undecided; "3" voting Yes on 9. By election day, more than 138,000 total voters (including approximately 50,000 "1's") were identified in Clackamas, Washington, Multnomah, Marion, Jackson, Tillamook, Hood River, Deschutes, Lane, Benton and Coos counties. PERSUASION Canvassing The next step of our program was to re-contact the "2's", the undecided voters. We felt the best strategy to counter the anonymous literature drops by the OCA was making personal contact between our supporters and undecided voters. We organized a door-to-door canvass operation. In the Tri-county metropolitan area, volunteers from Portland were sent to augment local volunteer efforts to visit undecided voters in Washington and Clackamas Counties (both counties are largely suburban, and are the second and third most populous counties in Oregon). Volunteers carried voter lists with the names of "2's" and uncontacted voters highlighted. Voter lists were ordered in "walking order," used first on the phone bank, and then photocopied for volunteers to take door-to-door. More than 1100 volunteers working in pairs canvassed in the metropolitan area during the final four weekends; they carried a persuasion piece of literature that reinforced media messages currently showing on TV. Literature was provided to regional campaigns for their canvass programs. We encouraged local activists unable to canvass rural districts to re-call the "2's" with a persuasion script. Persuasion Mail As money became available, we decided to send some late mailings to targeted groups of swing voters ( identified in our polls). >> A postcard to more than 100,000 Republican women aged 25-50 in 15 swing counties featured a photo and message from former Attorney General Dave Frohnmayer. >> A postcard to District 18 Democrats in Portland was targeted to the African American community and featured a photo and message from the Reverend Jesse Jackson.(District 18 is mostly Democratic and voted 90% for Jackson in '88.) Get Out The Vote We made a strategic decision to continue persuading voters until the Sunday before election day, delaying most Get Out The Vote activities until Monday, for the following reasons: >> The Presidential election was very high profile and a record high turnout of 82% was predicted for Oregon voters in November. >> Measure 9 was equally high profile; virtually every voter in the state knew what Measure 9 was and planned to vote on it. Regional GOTV strategies included: >> A memo and follow-up phone calls to all regional campaigns that presented three options for GOTV activities (see attached). >> Assignment of key staff and volunteers to Jackson and Marion counties to help with GOTV efforts. Tri-County GOTV strategies included: >> Blind pulling (blanketing with a GOTV drive) of key precincts in Multnomah County Districts 12 and 14, where most of our base of support resided. (We coordinated with the Clinton campaign in this effort). >> More than 175 volunteers placed 5:30 a.m. door hangers on all doors in blind pull precincts. >> Poll watching of voter turnout in blind pull precincts, with check of names of all Democrat and Independent voters. >> Five Sound vans circulated from 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. Equipped with cellular phones, we dispatched the vans into precincts that were turning out lower than our expectations. Volunteers got out of the vans and door-knocked all doors in those precincts. In Washington and Clackamas counties, poll checking activities during the day allowed us to cross names of "1's" off of lists before sending the lists to our 5:00 - 8:00 p.m. phone banks. (Note that alphabetical lists were ordered and names of "1's" manually highlighted by volunteers in order to facilitate the matching of alphabetical lists with poll books, which are organized in alphabetical order.) In key precincts, we were able to track specific results of our efforts: overall turnout of voters was 67% by 1:00 pm in one sample precinct, in which 78% were No on 9 voters. GOTV efforts were augmented by 20,000 free GOTV phone calls which were donated by Telemark Services. Calls were made into targeted precincts in Multnomah and Lane Counties. (Lane County is the 5th most populous county in Oregon.) Lawn Signs: 25,000 No on 9 lawn signs were printed and distributed during the campaign. Signs were sold for $3.00 in high support areas (Portland) in order to subsidize low-cost or free distribution of signs to other areas of the state. Signs were given out for free in targeted swing areas. RECOMMENDATIONSÊFOR FUTURE CAMPAIGNS:; >> Given that most activists in the No on 9 Campaign had little or no electoral campaign experience, I would recommend that future campaigns provide much more training and back-up support to regional organizations. Three separate trainings would be ideal: one focused on Voter ID, a second on canvassing, the third on GOTV. >> The educational components of the campaign - speakers bureaus, forums and debates - should use the persuasive messages of campaign speakers by tying their work in with Voter ID programs. A critical role that speakers bureaus can play is recruiting activists. >> Good planning from the central office should maintain consistency of messages and presentations of those messages by carefully planning deliveries of literature, materials, etc., on time. A timeline shared with local campaign field operations for print ads, deliveries, coordinated canvassing dates, etc. is critically important. >> In future campaigns, where money allows, absentee voters should receive mailings from the campaign. We did nothing with absentees and eventually lost Jackson County (where many absentee voters live) as a result. >> Better budgetary oversight would have allowed us to plan for more direct mail; I would target more groups of persuadable voters with mail in the future. ----- To request the complete Fight the Right Action Kit, call NGLTF at 202-332-6483, TTY 202-332-6219. .