From: [email-masked]
Date: Sun, 6 Aug 1995 18:50:06 -0400

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Marriage                [email-masked]

LEGAL QUOTATIONS

PUBLIC POLICY/EVASION/CONFLICT OF LAWS

". . .the public policy of a state is not fixed in time but may change as
societal changes take place." [1]

"The repeal of a state's sodomy statute should also be treated as a
manifestation of a state's public policy." [2]

"Because of the universal acceptance of the rule favoring the validation of
marriages and the important policies promoted by that rule, courts should
require their state legislatures to state more than a mere preference for
traditional social arrangements before they hold that their marriage statute
demonstrates a strong public policy against recognizing the homosexual
marriages of a sister state." [3]

"The comments to the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act indicate that section
210 was intended to validate marriages, even if the parties would not have
been allowed to marry in their domicile.  The comment also states that
section 210 'expressly fails to incorporate the "strong public policy"
exception to the Restatement [Second] and hence may change the law in some
jurisdictions.  This section will preclude invalidation of many marriages
which would have been invalidated in the past.'" [4]

"Couples living in. . .marriage evasion statute states who intend to travel
to Hawaii to enter a same-sex marriage may find their marriages subject to
challenge under the evasion statutes.  [For those states which do not]
expressly prohibit same-sex marriage, however, it is likely that their courts
would be bound to follow earlier precedent requiring an express prohibition
in the positive law of the state before the evasion statute's language would
become relevant.  If that is the case, same-sex marriage should be upheld as
valid." [5]

"The majority approach, however, considers even a blatant evasion of forum
law irrelevant in determining the validity of a marriage." [6]

"Except for states which have expressly forbidden same-sex marriage, courts
should not find a strong public policy from the absence of a statute
permitting same-sex marriage." [7]

"The court [in Baker v. Nelson, an early (lost) gay marriage case] decided
that because marriage laws were not intended specifically to authorize
same-sex marriages, such marriages were necessarily prohibited.  This form of
reasoning directly contradicts the foundation 
-2-

principle that in a 'free' society, anything not prohibited is permitted; it
is only in 'command' societies that the reverse is considered true, that
anything not specifically permitted is prohibited." [8]

"It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV.  It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from blind imitation of the past." [9]

"One principle to be weighed is 'the choice of the law reflecting an
'emerging' policy over one embodying a 'regressive' policy." [10]

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:  "I think it most important to remember
whenever a doubtful case arises, with certain analogies on one side and other
analogies on the other, that what is really before us is a conflict between
two social desires, each of which seeks to extend its dominion over the case,
and which cannot both have their way. . .Where there is doubt the simple tool
of logic does not suffice, and even if it is disguised and unconscious, the
judges are called on to exercise the sovereign prerogative of choice." [11]

MARRIAGE DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

"Just as a court cannot simply cite the fact that a legislature had passed a
particular statute to establish the statute's constitutionality, a court
cannot simply cite a definition to establish a state's constitutionality,
unless that definition has independent and significant weight."  Neither the
fact that a legislature passed a statute nor the fact that a statute
incorporates a particular definition saves the statute from constitutional
infirmity. . .When determining the constitutionality of a statute, courts
must resist the tendency to give great deference to definitions.  Otherwise,
legislatures may be tempted to take advantage of this judicial tendency to
protect their enactments by creating definitions that bring about the desired
effects.  For example, suppose that a legislature were to include within its
definition of family the following condition: 'No family shall contain more
than two members not related by blood.'  While a law prohibiting most
adoptions by married couples would not survive constitutional scrutiny, this
hypothetical statute could not be struck down if definitions were somehow
exempted from judicial scrutiny, since this statute would preclude adoptions
definitionally rather than merely prohibit them statutorily." [12]  Terms
like "gay marriage" are now commonplace.  "An appeal to legal definitions is
simply question-begging, while an appeal to nonlegal definitions may support
the opposite position." [13]

"The fact that a definition is derived from the common law, rather than from
an associated statutory provision, does not immunize it from Constitutional
scrutiny." [14]

MARRIAGE AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

"As the Supreme Court has noted 'The Freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness.'  Yet, the freedom to marry is not a vital right
essential only to the happiness of heterosexuals; it is vital to the
happiness of homosexuals as well.  The Court has recognized that individuals
cannot be denied the essential elements of their happiness as long as those
essential elements do not harm others." [15]
-3-

"It strains credibility. . .to suggest that prohibiting a homosexual from
marrying someone of the same sex is not a significant interference with the
decision to enter into the marital relationship. [16]

". . .the right to marry requires more than that all citizens be given the
opportunity to marry, which would not be abridged by the anti-miscegenation
statute invalidated by Loving." [17]

"If the Court is going to remain within its tradition of recognizing the
fundamental rights to marry and to have a family and of only recognizing
sexual rights as something instrumentally connected to those rights, the
Court will have to recognize homosexual marriages before it can recognize a
right to homosexual sodomy." [18]

"The Georgia Statute upheld in Bowers burdened only sexual interests and
therefore needed to survive only rational basis scrutiny.  In the case of
same-sex marriage, state law burdens the individual's fundamental rights to
marriage and family.  State interests held sufficient in Bowers to uphold
Georgia's sodomy statute do not necessarily justify marriage laws that are
subject to strict scrutiny." [19]

"In finding that the fundamental right to marry is restricted to opposite-sex
couples, the Hawaii Supreme Court made the same error that the United States
Supreme Court made in Bowers v. Hardwick.  Just as the Bowers Court erred by
focusing on the existence of a fundamental right to homosexual sodomy,
instead of recognizing a fundamental right to privacy in one's choice of
sexual partners, so too did the Baehr court err by focusing on the existence
of a fundamental right to same-sex marriage, instead of applying the already
recognized fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples." [20]

"Ironically, [U.S. Supreme Court] Justice Powell later admitted before a
group of law students at New York University that he had probably made a
mistake in concurring with the majority in Bowers, a vote which would have
changed the outcome of the [precedent-setting sodomy] case." [21] 

"Same-sex couples are the only adults, other than those who violate some
additional statutory proscription, who are not freely permitted to marry the
partner of their choice." [22]

". . .the right to marry is the right to join in marriage with the person of
one's choice. . .It is a fundamental right of free men." [23]

"The fourteenth amendment. . .requires that all citizens 'be represented in
the sense that their interests are not to be left out of account or valued
negatively in the lawmaking process'." [24]

". . .the [Supreme] Court has emphasized that '[c]are must be taken in
ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and
stereotypic notions." [25]

PROCREATION ISSUES

"If heterosexuals might adopt a child and thus their inability to have
children of their own would not preclude them from having and raising a
family, it is surprising that the court is so 
-4-

confident that a homosexual couple could not likewise have and raise a
family. . .It is at best disingenuous to hold that than an essential
precondition of marriage is that the couple plans to have children, but that
the state's requiring only certain people to meet that condition is a mere
theoretical imperfection.  In any case, no responsible legal authority
believes that the desire and willingness to have children is an essential
precondition of marriage except in the context of attempting to show why
there can be no homosexual marriages." [26]

"To cite the existence of antisodomy laws to show why same-sex marriages
should not be recognized, and to refuse to strike down laws criminalizing
homosexual sodomy because there is '[n]o connection between family, marriage
or procreation on the one hand, and homosexual activity on the other,'
involves the height of bad faith and hypocrisy." [27]

"The state has no compelling interest in encouraging procreation for the sake
of the survival of the human race.  Empirically, the real danger of human
survival is from overpopulation, not underpopulation." [28]

"In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court established the right of
married couples to use contraception, and hence to engage in non-procreative
sex." [29]

"If the ability or desire to procreate is not a prerequisite for the marriage
of heterosexuals there is no rational reason why it should be one for
homosexuals." [30]

RACE, OTHER MARRIAGE EXCLUSIONS, ANALOGIES

In Zablocki v. Redhail (434 U.S. 374  (1978)), the U.S. Supreme Court found
that a Wisconsin statute prohibiting indigents who had not met child support
obligations from remarrying was unconstitutional, because marriage is a
fundamental right (and the state couldn't meet the heightened scrutiny
therefore imposed).  The court ruled that the state's power to regulate
marriage doesn't include the ability to exclude certain people from its
definition.  ". . .Justice Marshall's invocation of equal protection analysis
aptly indicates that the state may not use its power to define marriage in a
manner that excludes an identifiable class of persons from marrying." [31]  

In Loving v. Virginia (388 U.S. 1 (1967)), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
states may not enact laws prohibiting its citizens from marrying a person of
a different race.  One commentator criticizes early gay marriage decisions
which claimed the issue was a supposed 'right to same-sex marriage':  "But
what if the [Loving] Court had interpreted this as a claim to a 'right to a
mixed-race marriage' and then inquired into the pedigree of that narrowly
defined right?  The result could not have been the same." [32]  The heart of
the matter is the level of generality assumed in asking the question.  This
commentator explains and criticizes one conservative approach to this which
as been put forth:  "The problems with Justice Scalia's 'most specific level'
[i.e., "same-sex marriage" as a fundamental right as rather than marriage per
se as a fundamental right] approach are, however, legion.  One serious
objection is that it puts the methodological cart before the fundamental
rights horse: It chooses a rule for the putative merit of its rigidity,
rather than because it reflects the character of the constitutional rights in
question.  Moreover, the results of this methodological approach is anything
but neutral: It gives the narrowest possible interpretation to fundamental
rights by 
-5-

constitutionalizing exceptions to them.  Far from cabining judicial
discretion, it simply entrenches at the methodological level one Justice's
narrow conception of fundamental rights."  "The judicial discretion becomes
arbitrary when the 'most specific level' methodology is itself selectively
applied in some cases but not in others.  In Dean v. District of Columbia
(No. 90-13892, slip op. at 3-4 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 2, 1992)), the court
expressly rejected the view that this methodology must be applied in all
fundamental rights cases yet 'recognize[d] that such a mode of analysis may
be useful and appropriate in particular instances,' including the same-sex
litigation that was before it.  It is difficult to imagine a more naked
expression of result-driven jurisprudence than this." [33]  

"Loving v. Virginia, after all, had invalidated a statute whose premises were
equally the product of 'commonsense' and an 'historic institution. . .deeply
founded'." [34]

"One case, State v. Bell, exemplifies the similarity between [miscegenation]
cases and our same-sex couple married in Hawaii.  Because they're interracial
marriage wasn't considered legal in that state, they were charged with
"fornication."  [The court wrote in part:]

'Extending the rule to the width asked by the defendant, and we might have in
Tennessee the father living with his daughter, the son with the mother, the
brother with the sister, in lawful wedlock, because they had formed such
relations in a State or country where they were not prohibited.  The Turk or
Mohammedan, with his numerous wives, may establish his harem at the doors of
the capitol, and we are without remedy.  Yet none of these are more
revolting, more to be avoided, or more unnatural than the case before us.'
[35]

"It does not take much imagination to envision reading this language applied
to a same-sex marriage, celebrated in Hawaii, and challenged in various
states.  Not until the 1948 case Perez v. Lippold, when the California
Supreme Court declared its anti-miscegenation statute to be unconstitutional,
did a trend begin toward recognizing the racial discrimination inherent in
these statutes.  As Justice Traynor noted in Perez:  'A member of any of
these races may find himself barred by law from marrying the person of his
choice and that person to him may be irreplaceable.  Human beings are bereft
of worth and dignity by a doctrine that would make them as interchangeable as
trains.'" [36]

"Just as interracial couples cannot be made to suffer any legal disadvantage
that same-race couples are spared, gay couples cannot be made to suffer any
legal disadvantage that heterosexual couples are spared.  Lesbians and gay
men must be permitted to marry." [37]

"Opponents of the legal recognition of same-sex unions often fail to point
out that the reasons currently used to establish the
inappropriateness/impermissibility of same-sex marriages have been used in
the past to establish that same thesis with respect to marriages between
members of different races.  Interracial marriages were claimed to be
immoral, unnatural, and disapproved of by society." [38] 

-6-

"Just as it is clear that antimiscegenation laws were meant to discriminate
against one group, it is clear that legislation banning same-sex marriages is
intended to discriminate against one group.  Indeed, the legislation banning
same-sex marriages seems even more invidiously discriminatory than
antimiscegenation legislation, since it seeks to prevent a whole class of
individuals from marrying the only people to whom they are physically
attracted." [39]

"Suppose, for example, that certain members of the population were
predominately or exclusively physically attracted to members of a different
race.  Precluding them from intermarrying would induce them to form a couple
with the would-be partner without the benefit of marriage, remain single, or
marry someone of the correct race while remaining predominately or
exclusively attracted to individuals of a different race." [40]

"Suppose that people such as Carla like living in blue houses but do not like
living in red ones, and that people such as Don like living in red ones but
do not like living in blue ones.  Suppose further that people like Carla feel
that the value of living in a house is diminished when people like Don also
live in houses.  The state would hardly be justified in passing legislation
that required people like Don to either live in blue houses or not to live in
houses at all.  Carla might point out that people like Don have not been
entirely precluded from living in houses, since they can live in blue ones.
 Further, people like Don have other options; they can choose not to live in
houses at all but instead to live in apartments.  Carla might further point
out that people like Don are not the only ones precluded from living in red
houses; people like Carla are also precluded.  (Carla might choose not to
emphasize that people like her do not like living in red houses anyway.)  Of
course, people like Carla would not be pleased that people like Don in fact
choose to live in blue houses rather than live in apartments, since the value
of living in a blue house would be diminished were people like Don to do so.
 People like Carla would prefer that people like Don not live in houses or,
in the best of all possible worlds, simply not be." [41]

SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION AS SEX DISCRIMINATION

". . .[The] argument, that the ERA would require only that male couples be
treated the same as female couples, ignores the fact that the ERA protects
individuals, not couples.  Therefore, it is the individual's right--to marry
a man as a woman is allowed or to marry a woman as a man is allowed--that is
at stake." [42]

"Similarly, one could argue, failure to issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples denied women the right to marry women--a right that only men would be
allowed to exercise--and denied men the right marry men--again, treating men
and women differently." [43]

 "As a matter of definition, if the same conduct is prohibited or stigmatized
when engaged in by a person of one sex, while it is tolerated when engaged in
by a person of the other sex, then the party imposing the prohibition or
stigma is discriminating on the basis of sex. . .That is what happens
whenever gays are discriminated against.  If a business fires Ricky, or if
the state prosecutes him, because of his sexual activities with Fred, or
while these actions would not be taken against Lucy if she did exactly the
same things with Fred, then Ricky is being discriminated against because of
his sex.  If Lucy is permitted to marry Fred, but Ricky may not marry Fred,
then. . .Ricky is being discriminated against because of his sex." [44]

-7-

"Just as proponents of the federal Equal Rights Amendment denied opponents'
allegations that sex equality would require legal recognition of gay
marriage. . .proponents of the fourteenth amendment denied opponents'
allegations that racial equality would require legal recognition of
interracial marriage. . ." [45]

SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS, CHILDREN

"Psychologist C.A. Tripp reports that:

'the settled in qualities of the homosexual couple tend to be precisely those
which characterize the stable heterosexual relationship.  The similarities
evidenced in daily life are especially noticeable.  The way the partners
interact as they engage in conversation, the way casual affection is
expressed and minor irritations are dealt with, as well as how visitors are
treated, or dinner is served, and myriad other details of everyday life are
all more or less indistinguishable.  Viewed from this angle, there are
clearly more differences between individuals and couples than there are
between kinds of couples.'" [46]

". . .the [marriage-related privacy] values emphasized by Justice Douglas in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) include intimacy, harmony,
and bilateral loyalty, but not procreation." [47]

"'Whether or not a jurisdiction [legally recognizes same-sex families], their
courts must inevitably deal with the offspring of these unions and must
determine rights for support, visitation, inheritance and all the other
traditional rights stemming from a heterosexual marriage.'" [48]

"Protecting children from the societal prejudice associated with being raised
by a same-sex couple is a more realistic concern.  Many of the children of
same-sex couples will encounter social prejudice.  They will encounter
prejudice, however, whether or not their parents legally marry.  Legally
recognizing the validity of same-sex unions will not add to that prejudice
and could very well work to dissipate it." [49]

"According to a recent American Bar Association study, eight to ten million
children are currently being raised in three million gay households." [50]

"How ironic that promiscuity and instability are stereotypes associated with
a group in society that has been trying to gain recognition of their stable
relationships.  And, how ironic it is that a society that embraces these
stereotypes will not offer the mechanism, marriage, by which same-sex
partners could demonstrate their commitments to each other and to their
relationship." [51]

"Those who argue that marriage has always been patriarchal and thus always
will be make the 
-8-

same historical mistake, in mirror image, as the courts that have
essentialized the 'nature' of marriage.  There is no 'always has been and
ever shall be' truth of marriage." [52]

In Braschi v. Stahl Associates, the New York Court of Appeals, in ruling that
the surviving same-sex lover was "family" for purposes of rent control
succession.  It said that a family was defined by:  "[T]he exclusivity and
longevity of the relationship, the level of emotional and financial
commitment, the manner in which the parties have conducted their everyday
lives and held themselves out to society, and the reliance placed upon one
another for daily family services. . .[I]t is the totality of the
relationship as evidenced by the dedication, caring and self-sacrifice of the
parties [that] should, in the final analysis, control." [53]

"Heterosexuals rely heavily on an idealized marital tradition when they deny
marriage to us, though it reflects neither their experience nor ours." [54]

------------------------------------------------------------------

NOTES

ENDNOTES********************************

[1]. "A Conflict of Laws and Morals: The Choice of Law Implications of
Hawaii's Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages," by Joseph Hovermill, in Maryland
Law Review, Vol. 53: 458 (1994).

[2].  "A Conflict of Laws and Morals: The Choice of Law Implications of
Hawaii's Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages," by Joseph Hovermill, in Maryland
Law Review, Vol. 53: 459 (1994).

[3].  "A Conflict of Laws and Morals: The Choice of Law Implications of
Hawaii's Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages," by Joseph Hovermill, in Maryland
Law Review, Vol. 53: 488 (1994).

[4]. "Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We
Still Married When We Return Home?," by Barbara Cox, in Wisconsin Law Review,
Vol. 30: 1068 (1994) [Footnotes omitted].

[5]. "Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We
Still Married When We Return Home?," by Barbara Cox, in Wisconsin Law Review,
Vol. 30: 1077 (1994).

[6]. "A Conflict of Laws and Morals: The Choice of Law Implications of
Hawaii's Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages," by Joseph Hovermill, in Maryland
Law Review, Vol. 53: 463 (1994).

[7]. "Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We
Still Married When We Return Home?," by Barbara Cox, in Wisconsin Law Review,
Vol. 30: 1100 (1994).

[8]. "Same-Sex Marriage," by Otis Damslet, in New York Law School Journal of
Human Rights, Vol. 10: 565-566 (1993).

[9]. "The Path of the Law," by Oliver Wendell Holmes, in Harvard Law Review,
Vol. 10: 457, 469 (1897), quoted in "Same-Sex Marriage," by Otis Damslet, in
New York Law School Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 10: 574 (1993).

[10]. "Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We
Still Married When We Return Home?," by Barbara Cox, in Wisconsin Law Review,
Vol. 30: 1104-1105 (1994).

[11]. "Law in Science and Science in Law," in Collected Legal Papers, by
Oliver Wendell Holmes, 1920, pg. 239, quoted in "Constitutional Aspects of
the Homosexual's Right to a Marriage License," by Arthur Silverstein, in
Journal of Family Law, Vol. 12: 634 (1972-73).

[12]. "Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Miscegenation
Analogy," by Mark Strasser, in Suffolk University Law Review, Vol. 25:
984-985 (1991) [Footnotes omitted] [Emphases in original].

[13]. "Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Miscegenation
Analogy," by Mark Strasser, in Suffolk University Law Review, Vol. 25: 989
(1991).

[14].  "The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage:
Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family," by Alissa
Friedman, in Berkeley Women's Law Journal, Vol. 3: 151 (1987-88).

[15]. "Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Miscegenation
Analogy," by Mark Strasser, in Suffolk University Law Review, Vol. 25: 999
(1991).

[16]. "Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Miscegenation
Analogy," by Mark Strasser, in Suffolk University Law Review, Vol. 25: 1007
(1991).

[17].  "The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage:
Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family," by Alissa
Friedman, in Berkeley Women's Law Journal, Vol. 3: 156 (1987-88).

[18]. "Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Miscegenation
Analogy," by Mark Strasser, in Suffolk University Law Review, Vol. 25:
1033-1034 (1991) [Footnotes omitted].

[19].  "The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage:
Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family," by Alissa
Friedman, in Berkeley Women's Law Journal, Vol. 3: 164 (1987-88).

[20]. "Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We
Still Married When We Return Home?," by Barbara Cox, in Wisconsin Law Review,
Vol. 30: 1056-57 (1994).

[21]. "Society's Ban on Same-Sex Marriages: A Reevaluation of the So-Called
'Fundamental Right' of Marriage," by Julienne Scocca, in Constitutional Law
Journal, Vol. 2: 737 (1992) [Footnote No. 97].

[22]. "Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We
Still Married When We Return Home?," by Barbara Cox, in Wisconsin Law Review,
Vol. 30: 1109 (1994).

[23]. Perez v. Sharp (32 California 2d. 711, 714, 715, 198 P.2d 17-19 (1948),
quoted in "Same-Sex Marriage and Constitutional Privacy: Moral Threat and
Legal Anomaly," by Hannah Schwarzschild, in Berkeley Women's Law Journal,
Vol. 4: 101 (1988-89). 

[24]. Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, by John Hart Ely,
1980, pg. 82, quoted in "Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is
Sex Discrimination," by Andrew Koppelman, in New York University Law Review,
Vol. 69, No. 2: 227 (May 1994).

[25]. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 724 (1976), quoted
in  "The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage: Constitutional
Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family," by Alissa Friedman, in Berkeley
Women's Law Journal, Vol. 3: 145 (1987-88).

[26]. "Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Miscegenation
Analogy," by Mark Strasser, in Suffolk University Law Review, Vol. 25: 1011
(1991) [Emphases in original].

[27]. "Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Miscegenation
Analogy," by Mark Strasser, in Suffolk University Law Review, Vol. 25: 1020
(1991) [Footnotes omitted].

[28].  "The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage:
Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family," by Alissa
Friedman, in Berkeley Women's Law Journal, Vol. 3: 161 (1987-88).

[29]. "Same-Sex Marriage," by Otis Damslet, in New York Law School Journal of
Human Rights, Vol. 10: 568 (1993).

[30]. "Constitutional Aspects of the Homosexual's Right to a Marriage
License," by Arthur Silverstein, in Journal of Family Law, Vol. 12: 627
(1972-73).

[31]. "Same-Sex Marriage and the Right of Privacy," in Yale Law Journal, Vol.
103: 1506-1507 (1994).

[32]. "Same-Sex Marriage and the Right of Privacy," in Yale Law Journal, Vol.
103: 1509 (1994).

[33]. "Same-Sex Marriage and the Right of Privacy," in Yale Law Journal, Vol.
103: 1510 (1994).

[34]. "Same-Sex Marriage and Constitutional Privacy: Moral Threat and Legal
Anomaly," by Hannah Schwarzschild, in Berkeley Women's Law Journal, Vol. 4:
115 (1988-89). 

[35]. State v. Bell (66 Tennessee (7 Barger) 9 (1872)), quoted in "Same-Sex
Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When
We Return Home?," by Barbara Cox, in Wisconsin Law Review, Vol. 30: 1115
(1994).

[36]. 198 P.2d 17 (California 1848), quoted in "Same-Sex Marriage and Choice
of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home?," by
Barbara Cox, in Wisconsin Law Review, Vol. 30: 1115 (1994).

[37]. "Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination," by Andrew Koppelman, in New York University Law Review, Vol.
69, No. 2: 284 (May 1994).

[38]. "Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Miscegenation
Analogy," by Mark Strasser, in Suffolk University Law Review, Vol. 25: 1008
(1991) [Footnotes omitted].

[39]. "Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Miscegenation
Analogy," by Mark Strasser, in Suffolk University Law Review, Vol. 25:
1018-1019 (1991).

[40]. "Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Miscegenation
Analogy," by Mark Strasser, in Suffolk University Law Review, Vol. 25: 995
(1991).

[41]. "Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Miscegenation
Analogy," by Mark Strasser, in Suffolk University Law Review, Vol. 25: 998
(1991).

[42]. "The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage:
Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family," by Alissa
Friedman, in Berkeley Women's Law Journal, Vol. 3: 141 (1987-88).

[43].  "The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage:
Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family," by Alissa
Friedman, in Berkeley Women's Law Journal, Vol. 3: 145 (1987-88).

[44]. "Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination," by Andrew Koppelman, in New York University Law Review, Vol.
69, No. 2: 208 (May 1994).

[45]. "Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination," by Andrew Koppelman, in New York University Law Review, Vol.
69, No. 2: 210 (May 1994). [Footnote No. 42].

[46]. The Homosexual Matrix, by C.A. Tripp, 1987, pg. 159, quoted in  "The
Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage: Constitutional
Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family," by Alissa Friedman, in Berkeley
Women's Law Journal, Vol. 3: 157 (1987-88).

[47].  "The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage:
Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family," by Alissa
Friedman, in Berkeley Women's Law Journal, Vol. 3: 158 (1987-88) [Footnote
No. 158].

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