Subject: ACT UP for PETA! (1 of 2)
From: [email-masked]
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 1996 09:11:31 -0400

It is a sad commentary on the current conservative shift of radical AIDS
activism that certain members of ACT UP have chosen to attack animal rights
supporters.

In recent press releases and articles in major metropolitan newspapers,
members of ACT UP Washington DC and ACT UP Golden Gate have joined
conservative drug-company front groups like Project Inform, the National
Association for Biomedical Research and the National Association of People
with AIDS in condemning the activities of PETA (People for the Ethical
treatment of Animals) and others determined to end the enslavement and
suffering of animals by humans.

As an HIV-infected faggot and a member of ACT UP San Francisco, I support the
work of PETA and the use of direct action tactics by animal rights activists
to demand the humane treatment of animals and the end of species
exploitation.

I believe that the recent self-serving media generated by certain people with
AIDS and the organizations with which they are affiliated is rooted in petty
politics, egocentrism and a desire to capitalize on the media generated by
World Animal Awareness Week rather than a sincere desire to examine the facts
and engage in dialogue. Furthermore, their arrogant opinions do not
constitute any sort of consensus among national ACT UP chapters nor people
with AIDS. Their spurious comments only serve to trivialize the importance of
both ending AIDS and the struggle for animal liberation.

It seems to me that animal rights activists and people with AIDS have much
more in common than they do at odds. Both animals and people with AIDS are
presently being exploited by the biomedical and pharmaceutical industries in
their relentless search to increase profits. It is up to the rank and file to
challenge both types of exploitation with direct action tactics and civil
resistance. One must wonder, when was the last time Jeff Getty, Steve Michael
or anyone at Project Inform was arrested at an AIDS protest.

Accusations that animal rights supporters "threaten AIDS research" by a
handful of AIDS organizations and PWAs who accept pharmaceutical industry
contributions and consequently tow the biomedical party line must be viewed
with suspicion. The reality is that in the last 15 years of this epidemic,
AIDS research has thrived on conflict of interest and has been predicated on
profit and greed. In the end, such product-oriented research has yielded
nothing but expensive, toxic antiviral drugs, dashed hopes and a mountain of
bodies dead from AIDS.

To subsequently blame the colossal failure of AIDS research in ending this
holocaust on the efforts of animal rights activists is frighteningly fascist
and patently revisionist. In fact, the conservative leanings of opponents to
animal rights can be seen in recent statements by Frankie Trull of the
National Association for Biomedical Research and Steve Michael of ACT UP
Washington DC, who label the support of the humane treatment of animals as
misguided and "politically correct"; a buzzword concocted by the right-wing
to dismiss discussions of crucial issues like civil rights for blacks, gays
and women.

In their attempts to malign supporters of animal rights, these diseased minds
claim that "many people with AIDS are staying healthy longer because of
medications developed through animal testing." However, they offer no
bonafide proof of such medications nor the types of animal testing that have
proved "beneficial" in bringing these medications to market. Even if such
proof was offered, this does not give human beings the right to utilize other
creature's lives for their own purposes nor negate the pain and suffering
endured by animals in lab tests.

The reality is that none of the currently approved anti-HIV medications have
been proven to delay the onset of opportunistic infections, extend the
survival time or improve the quality of life for people with AIDS. . .with or
without prior animal testing. AZT, 3TC, ddI, ddC and the current crop of
protease drugs are dangerous and immunosuppressive yet extremely profitable
for manufacturers like Glaxo-Wellcome and Abbott.

Furthermore, the sensationalistic, pie-in-the-sky xenotransplantation of
baboon bone marrow stem cells into AIDS patient and ACT UP Golden gate member
Jeff Getty proved to be nothing but a brutal effort in futility. To
subsequently tout such an utter failure in AIDS research as "support" for
continued experimentation on animals is deceptive, unnecessary and cruel.

In the end I do not accept the notion that the struggle for an animal
liberation and the demand for an end to AIDS are mutually exclusive
endeavors. Those who promote such a fallacy are either irrational,
mean-spirited, bought-out or all of the above.

To animal rights supporters everywhere I proclaim my solidarity. Good luck to
PETA and others in promoting a successful World Animal Awareness Week.

David Pasquarelli
ACT UP San Francisco

====================

The following is an article from a recent issue of, I believe, Science or
Nature.  Call ACT UP SF at (415) 522-2907 if you need the specific reference.

Xenotransplantation at a crossroads: Prevention versus progress

The infectious disease risks associated with baboon-to-human transplants may
represent an insurmountable hurdle in the race to save lives. Yet, public
health agencies are reluctant to regulate xenotransplantation in spite of
those risks.

By Jonathan S. Allan

Two public meetings were recently held to address the scientific, ethical and
the infectious disease issues involved in the practice of cross-species
transplantation to treat human disease (see Nature Medicine 1, 728; 1995).
Beyond this, a joint committee of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has now wrestled with
the unenviable task of formulating and publishing guidelines that address the
public health safety risks surrounding cross-species transplantation in
humans. A provisional draft of the guidelines, to be published in the Federal
Register (a U.S. government publication of both regulatory and legal notices)
represents more than six month's effort to navigate through a complex
problem. Having been a member of the FDA panel at which the guidelines were
discussed and having spoken at the both the IOM and FDA meetings about the
infectious disease risks associated with baboon transplants, I remain
concerned that the proposed guidelines will not significantly reduce the risk
of introducing a new human disease through xenotransplantation.

There are at least three main avenues that could have been taken in dealing
with the infectious disease risks surrounding xenotransplantation. First, all
cross-species transplants could have been banned, although a preferable
option would have been to permit only pig organ transplants. The decision to
proceed with both species means that our federal agencies have decided that
the potential medical benefits outweigh the infectious disease risks and that
any dangers represent "manageable" risks. Second, having approved these
procedures on principle, it seems reasonable to develop federal regulations
much the same as those that have been developed by the FDA to oversee gene
therapy and other novel therapeutic approaches in humans. One important
reason for developing such strict regulations has been to ensure that any
preparations such as monoclonal antibody treatments or gene delivery vectors
be free of replication-competent retroviruses. (Retroviruses can be a serious
problem because of their inherent ability to integrate into human chromosomes
with the potential for inducing cancer.) The FDA/CDC working group appears to
have instead opted for a third alternative-a series of guidelines to be
played out at the local level. Apparently there will be little federal
oversight once the transplant community has begun xenotransplantation in
earnest. It is also of concern that these guidelines provide few real
safeguards against the introduction and spread of new infectious diseases in
the human population.

Xenotransplantation's risks

The most pressing concern with cross-species transplants is the inherent risk
of transmitting animal viruses to humans. Several recent reviews have
addressed this risk (1-4). The infectious disease community has been on alert
for the appearance of new emerging diseases such as the recent Ebola virus
outbreak in Africa, the hantavirus outbreak in the Southwest United States,
and the reemergence of dengue fever that currently threatens Texas. It is
also well established that most new emerging human infectious diseases
generally have their origins in other species (5-7). A direct method of
establishing new human infectious disease would be to implant infected
tissues from a nonhuman species into humans thus allowing viruses direct
access to human tissues. Baboons carry several known viruses that have the
potential to infect humans; these include baboon herpesviruses (SA8, herpes
papio and CMV) and retroviruses (STLV, baboon endogenous virus and foamy
virus) to name but a few (8-12). To complicate matters, the natural host for
some infectious agents may also be naturally resistant to any disease
associated with infection, which means that there is no way of knowing from
any outward appearance whether or not a baboon, for example, carries a
potential human pathogen.

How likely is it that a baboon virus could infect and establish itself in
humans? Both the FDA and CDC have decided that, while baboon
xenotransplantation poses a risk, we cannot quantify that risk, and not to
proceed would put an end to scientific research dedicated toward using
baboons as donors for human transplantation. However, neither of these
agencies have stated that these procedures are safe and several of their
scientists have also raised some of the same concerns (12). In my opinion,
the risks associated with baboon donor tissue are significant and preclude
their use as donors. As stated, baboons are known carriers of several chronic
latent viruses that can infect human cells and might be a threat if they were
inoculated into people. Organ transplantation would circumvent most natural
barriers (skin, mucosal surfaces and the and environment of the stomach),
which means that baboon viruses not typically thought to be infectious for
humans such as blood-borne or sexually transmitted pathogens would now have
access to human organ systems. To put the potential risk into perspective,
there have been several instances where new emerging human viral diseases
have been traced to nonhuman primates. The best examples are the simian
immunodeficiency viruses (SIV) found in African nonhuman primates, two of
which (HIV-1 and HIV-2) have crossed into humans and are responsible for an
estimated 4.5 million AIDS cases worldwide (13). Of interest, these simian or
monkey viruses may have been harbored in African primates for thousands of
years without causing any disease in that host (14). Although a
baboon-specific SIV has yet to be identified, these monkeys do carry viruses
in persistent and latent forms, some of which can remain with the baboon
throughout its life, increasing the likelihood of its transmission to humans.
The first retrovirus discovered in humans, human T-cell Iymphotropic virus
(HTLV), also appears to have arisen by cross-species transmission of its
close cousin (STLV) from African nonhuman primates (15, 16).

HTLV and STLV induce leukemia and lymphoma in humans and baboons,
respectively, and like HIV they can be transmitted through blood transfusion
or sexual contact. Another dramatic example is the monkey equivalent of human
herpes simplex virus (herpes B virus) that is found naturally in macaques.
This virus causes only minor discomfort including conjunctivitis in monkeys,
yet humans that are infrequently infected through close contact with infected
monkeys invariably suffer a rapid and fatal encephalomyelitis (8). However,
the most insidious emerging viruses are not those such as Ebola-like viruses
or herpes B virus that have immediate and dramatic effects-they are acutely
lethal and as such can be effectively contained by quarantine-but viruses
including retroviruses that may have extended clinical latency following
infection and are therefore difficult to identify in the absence of
demonstrable disease. For a new emerging viral infection to become
established in humans, not only must a recipient become persistently infected
with a baboon virus but there also needs to be transmission from that
recipient to one or more contacts. Based on past experience with new
infectious diseases in humans and our inability to prevent the worldwide
spread of HIV infection, it comes as no surprise then that any measures put
in place to contain the spread of a new human infection, should it arise, are
unlikely to significantly curb the spread of a new baboon virus in the human
population.

The most immediate need for baboon tissues comes from the AIDS research
community. Recent proposals to attempt immune reconstitution of HlV-infected
patients using baboon-derived bone marrow have been widely publicized.
Whether or not bone marrow will be effective in reversing or ameliorating the
effects of HIV-1 on the immune system is still unknown and some believe that
this type of experiment may even hasten the death of the recipients (17). If
the patient has little chance of long-term survival, the new viral pathogen
is unlikely to be transmitted to others. The real hazard results from the
possibility of the recipient transmitting these viruses to their contacts
after leaving the hospital and hence the public health significance of these
procedures is directly related to the success of these surgical procedures.

The risks are not limited to bone marrow transplants. Several transplant
groups have proposed and will soon initiate clinical studies using baboon
hearts as a temporary measure for those awaiting suitable human donors. Here,
the patients' chances for survival are dramatically improved since the
intention is that they will ultimately receive human organs. Of course, any
baboon viruses implanted with the baboon heart will not be removed when the
baboon heart is. This stop-gap baboon heart transplantation protocol may
therefore be an ideal method of introducing and establishing a zoonotic
disease in the human population.

Having studied simian retroviruses for more than 11 years, I am acutely aware
of the damage that a supposedly innocuous virus might do, given the right
host. A public health disaster was narrowly averted during an Ebola virus
outbreak at a primate facility in Reston, Virginia. Not only were macaques
infected with an Ebola virus but they also harbored simian hemorraghic fever
virus (SHFV), a virus found naturally in African species but which also
causes acute illness in macaques. The success in containing these viruses
from being disseminated into the human population had more to do with the
biology of the viruses than any intervention on the part of public health
agencies. In fact several individuals were infected with the Reston Ebola
virus but luckily did not develop disease and did not spread the virus to
others. Thus, dodging the bullet in this case in no way should be regarded as
a success in terms of the measures used to contain such outbreaks. The Ebola
virus is an acute pathogen in monkeys and is not normally persistent. Federal
regulations prohibit housing Old World monkeys with New World species, or
Asian monkeys with African ones, precisely because of the fear of an
infectious disease debacle. As an example, squirrel monkeys harbor a
herpesvirus (H. saimiri) that causes no overt symptoms in that host, yet when
other species are infected they rapidly develop cancer.

Our experience with monkey viruses suggests it is difficult to predict the
outcome when a virus from one animal finds its way into another. This is
essentially the crux of the problem because a baboon virus is likely to be
passed to the recipient. The unquantifiable nature of that risk comes with
the outcome. However, simply because we can't measure the risk does not mean
that we should proceed. Once the door is opened and a new virus is unleashed,
it will be a monumental task to identify a new pathogen, develop adequate
screening tests and prevent the spread of that new infection.

Guidelines versus regulations?

Implicit in the development of the FDA/ CDC guidelines is the notion that
xenotransplantation may become an acceptable surgical procedure for the
foreseeable future. The most important question then becomes how can a virus,
once transmitted from a donor baboon to human, be limited or contained? In
choosing voluntary guidelines to be enforced at a local level, rather than
federal regulations, the FDA/CDC committee has chosen the least stringent and
possibly least successful method of policing these transplants procedures. As
a member of the FDA advisory panel that met recently to analyze a protocol
for using baboon bone marrow for treating an AIDS patient, I believe we were
heavily (and understandably) influenced by emotional pleas on the part of the
family of the recipient and by the local community. Knowing that one and only
one procedure was being voted upon, this transplant was approved.
Unfortunately, having opened the door, it will be difficult to close it
again. And if a federal panel can be so heavily influenced by political
expediency or desperation on the part of a patient or community, it is not
difficult to imagine that guidelines played out on the local level may be
similarly influenced by the urgency of these life-or-death dramas. The nature
of new infectious diseases necessitates that public health agencies remain
vigilant in preventing the introduction of both known and unknown pathogens
into a population.

The guidelines

Some of the proposed guidelines should lessen the infectious disease risk,
but none of them, in my opinion, will prevent the introduction or possible
spread of an unknown virus into the human population. There is little doubt
that thorough screening of donor animals for known viruses will significantly
decrease the possibility of transmitting a known virus to humans. In
transplant situations, it is blood-borne or sexually transmitted viruses that
are of most concern, and eliminating known infectious agents that are
transmitted among baboons by sexual contact will by inference lessen the risk
posed by uncharacterized viruses also harbored and transmitted by similar
routes. Nevertheless, there is no way to screen for viruses that have yet to
be discovered.

The guidelines also call for posttransplantation virological screening of the
human recipients for evidence of both known and unknown baboon viral
infections. Although this approach also has merit and should of course be
instituted, in cases where the agent is uncharacterized, this search, like
that in baboons, will be mostly ineffective. As an example, AIDS patients may
have many opportunistic infections, so the ability to identify novel
infectious agents from the list of known human pathogens would be no small
feat. Direct virus isolation of new agents should also be attempted with the
understanding that our ability to identify and isolate novel viruses may be
very limited.

Long-term surveillance and recipient transplant registries will help in the
tracing and containment of any new infections. Patients could also be advised
on the risks of donating blood and the need for vigilance with regard to
unexplained illnesses and unusual symptoms. However, these measures only
allow one to intercede after a problem has arisen, with the responsibility
directed toward containment rather than prevention. Also, leaving
surveillance and its costs to local review boards and local public health
officials may result in patients being lost to follow-up should they leave
the locale. Regional differences in practices might also mean only variable
success rates in containing a new infectious disease should it arise.
Unfortunately, however, lessons from the AIDS epidemic tell us that these
measures will be ineffective, because persons infected by contact with a
recipient are not likely to be part of a surveillance program. It has been
virtually impossible to stem the spread of HIV among the general population
in spite of the wealth of knowledge about HlV's transmission. That virus has
eluded some of the best and brightest for more than 15 years, a lesson that
is sadly etched into the souls of those infected and those who care for them.

To ensure that baboons are free from the known viruses will require intensive
screening and long-term breeding of baboons, much the same as has been
established for rhesus monkey breeding colonies in AIDS research. Simply
maintaining colonies in well-managed establishments without regard to the
pathogens that they carry does not constitute clean animals. Rhesus macaque
specific-pathogen-free (SPF) colonies have been developed for research
purposes, and there is no reason why the same facilities could not be
established for baboons. Not to establish government-sponsored primate
breeding resources for human transplantation would be irresponsible. The
necessary technology and the expertise is available. Having SPF animals is
likely to do more to reduce the risk of introducing a baboon virus into
humans than any other single measure. Obviously, we cannot screen for viruses
that are yet to be discovered (and there may be several of these), but
eliminating the known viruses that have various modes of transmission is also
likely to reduce the risk of unknown viruses. If the resolve to build and
fund baboon SPF colonies is not there, we should resolve to say "no" to
xenotransplantation.

In many ways, the pig offers a more promising transplant organ source. Pigs
are more amenable to SPF colonies, they have a much shorter generation time,
they have been bred in domesticity for thousands of years, and methods are
being developed to genetically manipulate this species to deal with
hyperacute rejection. By comparison, the baboon has a long generation time
(six years), high maintenance costs and overall a much higher risk of
harbouring potential human pathogens.

(continued in next email)

From: [email-masked]
Date: Wed, 19 Jun 1996 09:10:24 -0400
Subject: ACT UP for PETA! (2 of 2)

(continued from last email)

The alternatives

Seldom, if ever, have we had as much knowledge to prevent a future epidemic.
What is lacking is the wisdom to act upon that knowledge. Yet, it is not too
late to muster the will to halt baboon transplantation as an unacceptable
risk to the general health of humankind. Common sense tells us that the focus
should always be on prevention rather than containment. That means removing
nonhuman primates from the list of acceptable organ donors. Discussions aimed
at regulating xenotransplantation should consider the following points:

1. Limit donor species to pigs. Historical evidence weighs in heavily against
using baboons because of the pool of potential viruses they harbor. It is
also a forbidding task to find baboons that are free of the known baboon
viruses, and there may be too few of these from which to establish a
reasonable SPF colony.

2. Federal regulations and federal inspections should be established. These
should enforce strict adherence to regulations governing operating facilities
and procedures, licensing and medical practices to ensure that any errors in
judgment made at the local level do not jeopardize the public health.
Emerging diseases are global issues and should not be left in the hands of
local health agencies without clearly defined regulations and federal
oversight.

3. SPF colonies excluding all exogenous viruses normally found in that host
should be established to developing colonies that are also free from
endogenous retroviruses. To use animals known to harbor any virus that is
potentially infectious in humans is inexcusable.

4. Establish standardized screening criteria for all known animal viruses and
enforce rigorous quality control to ensure that infected animals are not used
A federal committee should discuss new emerging infections of those animals
and recommend changes to the list of excluded viruses.

Although these measures deserve careful consideration if xenotransplants are
to continue, at the same time it must be understood that even these measures
are unlikely to eliminate the risk of propagating a new infectious disease,
although they may reduce it significantly. In spite of the risk that might be
ascribed to these procedures and my personal opposition to proceeding with
xenotransplantation involving baboons, if the prevailing sentiment and
political will allow these transplants to happen, then it is critical that
strict regulations are fully implemented and that members of local boards
have the will and strong administrative support to approve protocols strictly
on the basis of their merit and adherence to policy. This level of concern
and regulation is not without precedent. Federally funded gene therapy
protocols undergo a strict scrutiny that aims to assess the balance between
risk and likely efficacy but is heavily weighted on the side of public
safety. Given that the risks from xenotransplantation may be far greater than
those of genetic engineering and therapy, no less should be expected for this
new and growing enterprise of cross-species medicine.

References:

1. Allan, J.S. Xenograft transplantation and the infectious disease
conundrum. ILAR J. 37, 37-48 (1995)

2. Allan, J.S. & Michaels, M. Xenotransplantation: Concerns aired over
potential new infections. Am. Soc. Microbiol. News 61,442-443 (1995).

3. Michaels, M.G. & Simmons, R.L. Xenotransplant-associated zoonoses.
Transplantation 57, 1-7 (1994).

4. Fishman, J.A. Miniature swine as organ donors for man: Strategies for
prevention of xenotransplant-associated infections. Xenotransplantation 1,
47-57 (1994).

5. Hjelle, B. et al. A novel hantavirus associated with an outbreak of fatal
respiratory disease in the southwestern United States: Evolutionary
relationships to known hantauruses. J. Virol. 68, 592-596 (1994).

6. Morse, S.S. & Schluederberg, A. Emerging viruses: The evolution of viruses
and viral diseases. J. Infect. Dis. 162, 1-7 (1990).

7. Murphy, F.A. New, emerging, and reemerging infectious diseases. Adv. Virus
Res. 4, 1-52 (1994).

8. Eberle, R. & Hilllard, J. The simian herpesviruses. Infect. Agents Dis. 4,
55-70 (1995).

9. Mone, J.P. et al. Simian T-cell leukemia virus type I infection in captive
baboons. AIDS Res. Hum. Retrovir. 8, 1653-1661 (1992).

10. Kalter, S.S.. Observations of apparent C-type particles in baboon (Papio
cynocephalus) placentas. Science 179, 1332-1333 (1973).

11. Flugel, R.M. Spumaviruses: A group of complex retroviruses. J. AIDS 4,
739-750 (1991).

12. Chapman, L.E. et al. Xenotransplantation and xenogenic infections. New
Engl. J. Med. 333, 1498-1501 (1995).

13. Myers, G., MacInnes, K. & Korber, B. The emergence of simian/human
immunodeficiency viruses. AIDS Res. Hum. Retrovir. 8, 373-386 (1992).

14. Allan, J.S. et al. Species-specific diversity among simian
immunodeficiency viruses from African green monkeys. J. Virol. 65, 2816-2828
(1991).

15. Poiesz, B.J. et al. Detection of type C retrovirus particles from fresh
and cultured lymphocytes of a patient with T-cell Iymphoma. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 77, 7415-7419 (1980).

16. Koralnik, I.J. et al. A wide spectrum of simian T-cell
leukemia/lymphotropic virus type I variants in nature: Evidence for
interspecies transmission in Equatorial Africa. J. Virol. 68, 2693-2707
(1994).

17. Thompson, C. No cheers for baboon to AIDS patient xenotransplant. Lancet
346, 369-370 (1995).

18. Lerche, N.W., Yee, J.L. & Jennings, M.B. Establishing specific
retrovirus-free breeding colonies of macaques: An approach to primary
screening and surveillance. Lab. Anim. Sci. 44, 217-221 (1994).

19. Ward, J.A., & Hilliard, J.K. B virus-specific pathogen-free (SPF)
breeding colonies of macaques: Issues, surveillance, and results in 1992.
Lab. Anim. Sci. 44, 222-228 (1994).